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NOTES
DEATH-SIMULTANEOUS

DEATH AND THE

DEVOLUTION

OF PROP-

General. Simultaneous death is an exception to the law of
average deaths, and yet it is startling to realize how often it does occur.
Simultaneous death, for our purposes in this note, constitutes a common
disaster wherein the person seized -of property and his beneficiary,
ERTY

-In

either at law or by instrument, perish without sufficient evidence to

show which survived. Our intention is to examine the effects this occurrence works in the devolution of property.
Under the Civil Law. Our problem is not new, for the Roman law
or civil law had fixed rules in regard to survivorship to aid the courts
in the distribution of property. Where two or more persons perished
in a common disaster, without evidence of survivorship, the civil law
presumed that when a father and son so died, if the son was above the
age of puberty, he survived his father. If all in the group were over
sixty, the youngest was presumed to have survived. Between the sexes
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in the same age class, the male was presumed to have survived unless
there was a disparity in their health, in which case the weaker was
deemed to have predeceased the stronger.1 Only two states in the
United States apply this rule: California 2 and Louisiana. 3
Under the Common Law. Many states adhere to the common law
rule. Different cases vary in the technical statement of the principle,
but the better decisions declare that there is no presumption whatsoever, either that one survived the other, or that both died simultaneously. Yet the property is distributed "as if the deaths were simultaneous." 4
The great majority of cases then place the burden of proof on the party
alleging survivorship; from the lack of evidence his claim generally
fails. 5
The lack of any presumption of survivorship or of simultaneous
death works in devolution by descent in the following manner: where
two persons perish in a common disaster and there is no evidence showing survivorship, where one would normally inherit from the other, the
property of each descends as though the other had never existed. This
is on the theory, as in the case of In re Sweeney's Estate,6 that the
property of a co-deceased father never vested in his co-deceased daughter or vice-versa. The consequences are the same when the parties in7
volved are husband and wife.
The distribution of property held in an estate by entirety presents
two views at common law. McGhee v. Henry 8 declares that property
1 16 Am. Jur. 33; 14 Ann. Cas. 718; Hildebrandt v. Ames, 27 Tex. Civ. App.
377, 66 S.W. 128 (1901); In re Hermann, 75 Misc. 599, 136 N. Y. S. 944 (1912).
2 Hollister v. Cordero, 76 Cal. 649, 18 Pac. 855 (1888); Carmondy v. Powell,
32 Cal. App. (2d) 56, 89 Pac. (2d) 158 (1939).
3 Successions of Langles, 105 La. 39, 29 So. 739 (1900).
4 Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan. 276 (1880); McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 572,
108 Atl. 196 (1919) ; Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Ia. 969, 204 N. W. 448, 43 A. L. R.
1340 (1925); Vaughan v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937); In re
Sweeny's Estate, 78 Pa. S. Ct. 417 (1922); St. John v. Andrews Institute for
Girls, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908); In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939); In re Willbor, 20 R. I. 126, 51 L. R. A. 863, 78 Am.
St. Rep. 842 (1897); 16 Am.Jur. 33; 41 Am. Dec. 523.
5 McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938); Cobler v.
Prudential Life Insurance Co., 108 Ind. App. 641, 31 N. E. (2d) 678 (1941); In
re Evan's Estate, 228 Ia. 908, 291 N. W. 460 (1940); In re Burza's Estate, 151
Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. S. 248 (1934), 155 Misc. 44, 279 N. Y. S. 90 (1935); In re
Macklin's will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941); Garbee v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co., 220 Mo. App. 1245, 290 S. W. 655 (1927); McCall v.
Thompson, 155 S. W. (2d) 161 (Mo. 1941); Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Ia. 969,
204, N. W. 448, 43 A. L. R. 1340 (1925); In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939). For a different view: Kansas P. R. Co. v. Miller, 2
Colo. 442 (1874); Middeke v. Balder, 198 Ill.
590, 64 N. E. 1002 (1902); Walton
& Co. v. Burchel, 121 Tenn. 715, 121 S.W. 391 (1907).
6 78 Pa. S. Ct. 417 (1922).
7 McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 572, 108 Atl. 196 (1919).
8 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509, 18 A. L. R. 103 (1921).
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held by entirety passes in the case of simultaneous death as if the husband and wife were tenants in common; that is, each group of heirs is
to get one half. Distribution is the same where the property is personalty and held in joint tenancyY The other view is set out in thQ
more recent case of In re Strong's Will,' 0 wherein the court declares
that the property held by entirety is distributed, in case of the simultaneous death of the tenants of an estate by entirety, on the theory of
contribution,--not on the theories of tenancy in common or joint tenancy; that only where there is a lack of sufficient evidence to show the
respective contributions of the husband and of the wife would the law
raise a presumption that each contributed one-half of the property, in
which case the respective groups of heirs would each get one-half of
the estate. The court says that the property held by entirety distributed
in this manner, in the event of.simultaneous death, would pass as if the
husband and wife were "constructive tenants in common." For several
reasons the court refuses to allow the property held by entirety to pass
as in a tenancy in common or joint tenancy where the evidence of contribution is sufficient. An estate by entirety is distinguished from the
other tenancies because of the irrevocable right of survivorship in both
the husband and the wife. The simultaneous death of the tenants by
entirety "frustrates" this right of survivorship; thus contribution is
held to be justified. Unlike a divorce case, in the case of "the simultaneous death of both spouses, there is no survivor; nor can one then
transfer anything to the other; and the marriage bond is dissolved more
absolutely, one might say, than by a decree of divorce." By this distinction, the court refuses to follow Williams v. Safety Savings & Loan
Association*1 Furthermore a tenancy in common does not result from
an estate by entirety on simultaneous death for tenancy in common can
refer only to the respective heirs or legatees of the spouses; and there
may not be property for one set of heirs or legatees to succeed to to hold
as tenants in common, because when shown by appropriate evidence
what each spouse originally contributed in creating the entirety, the
heirs of each spouse will get the contribution or proportion put in by
their ancestor and that only. The result could feasibly be one hundred
per cent to the husband's heirs, because of his initial contribution, and
nothing would devolve upon the heirs of the non-contributing wife.
Insurance. The influence of simultaneous death on the disposition
of property held in the form of life and accident insurance policies is
interesting. Where the named beneficiary and the insured are involved
in a common disaster the burden of proof is of capital importance, for
it determines in most cases to which estate the proceeds of the policy
shall go. The problem fundamentally is one of construction of the in9 Vaughan v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937).
10 171.Misc. 445, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939).
11 228 Mo. App. 135, 58 S. W. (2d) 787 (1933).
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surance contract, the courts generally being influenced by the intent of
the insured as evidenced in the instrument. 12 And some courts examine
the circumstances surrounding the insured when executing the instrument, considering especially the natural objects of his bounty. Inshort,
the contract of insurance is treated like a will.13
The numerical majority of cases hold that the burden of proof rests
upon the beneficiary's representatives to show his survival, where the
contract of insurance states, "if any beneficiary shall die before the
insured, the interest of such beneficiary shall vest in the insured." 14
This results in the proceeds of the policy passing to the representatives
of the insured, or by intestacy to the heirs. Variations in the wording
of the insurance contract have not worked noticeable change in the
decisions. For further examples, "$5,000 to the beneficiary, if living,
if not, then to assured's executors, administrators, or assigns;" 15 the
proceeds are payable to the beneficiary "if she survives the insured;
otherwise to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns." 16
The principles supporting the general rule are worthy of attention.
Whether there is a reservation in the insurance contract permitting the
insured to change the beneficiary at will is of first importance. Many
of the decisions hold that where there is such a reservation the intent
of the insured is that the beneficiary has no vested interest in the policy
merely an expectancy - and thus in a common disaster the representatives of the beneficiary bear the burden of proving the beneficiary's
survivorship; 17 therefore, the proceeds pass to the 'representatives of
12 In re Cava's Estate, 174 Misc. 750, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 999 (1940); Roberts
v. Hardin, 179 Ga. 114, 175 S. E. 362 (1934).
18 Dunn v. Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. S. 229

(1910); In re Burza's Estate, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. S. 248 (1934), 155 Misc.
44, 279 N. Y. S. 90 (1935); Morgan v. Sackett, 172 Misc. 855, 16 N. Y. S. (2d)
583 (1939).
14 Middeke v. Balder, 198 Ill.
590, 64 N. E. 1002 (1902); Males v. Sovereign
Camp W. W., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 70 S. W. 108 (1902); Fuller v. Linzee, 135
Mass. 468 (1883); Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420, 45 A. L. R.
618 (1926) ; McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. '(2d) 250 (1938) ; Morgan
v. Sackett, 172 Misc. 855, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 583 (1939); Dunn v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. S. 229 (1910); In re Burza's Estate,
151 Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. S.248 (1934), 155 Misc. 44, 279 N. Y. S. 90 (1935);
Colovos v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S. W. (2d) 820 (1937). Contra: (onus on
insured): Watkins v. Home Life & Accident Insurance Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208
S. W. 587 (1919); Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 AtI. 64, 10 L. R. A. 550
(1891) ; In re Cava's Estate, 174 Misc. 750, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 999 (1940).
15 McGowan v. Menkin, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877, 5 A. L. R. 794 (1918);
McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938). Contra: U. S.
Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 58 L. R. A. 36 (1902).
16 McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938); Baldus v.
Jeremias, 296 Pa. 313, 145 Ati. 820 (1929); In re Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432,
30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941).
17 McGowan v. Menkin, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N-E-977, S A. L. R. 794 (1918);
Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420, 45.A.,L. R. 618 (1926) ; Sovereign
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the insured, though there are a few cases to the contrary.' 8 The confrary is true where the insured has not reserved the right to change the
beneficiary; that is, the beneficiary is deemed to have a vested interest
in the proceeds which is not defeated in a simultaneous death of the
beneficiary and the insured; 19 but even this is controverted in a recent
decision. 20 Other cases hold that this reservation in the policy grants
only a conditional interest which becomes absolute or vested upon proof
of survivorship, 21 which is another way of saying the same thing. A few
jurisdictions assert that death of itself, even if simultaneous, makes the
interest of the beneficiary absolute whether there is a reservation clause
or not. 22 The soundest reason, which has not received much express
judicial notice, is that the presence of a reservation clause makes it apparent that the insured intended the natural objects of his bounty to
take under the policy, and in the event of their inability to take the
proceeds upon the insured's death the said proceeds are to go to his
representatives to put his estate in order. 28 Certainly public policy
supports this view.
When a policy provides for successive beneficiaries, that is $1,000 to
A if living; otherwise to B, and the insured and A perish in a common
disaster, the representatives of A must overcome the burden of proving
the survivorship of A to take under the policy. Since there is insufficient evidence supporting the claims of A's representatives, the proceeds of the policy devolve upon B, the second beneficiary, at least un24
less A has a vested interest.
Camp W. W. v. McKinnon, 48 Fed. (2d) 383 (1913); Miller v. McCarthy, 198
Minn. 497, 270 N. W. 559 (1936); Balder v. Jeremias, 296 Pa. 313, 145 Atl. 820
(1929); McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938); In re
Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941).
18 Watkins v. Home Life & Accident Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S. W. 587
(1919) ; Roberts v. Hardin, 179 Ga. 114, 175 S. E. 362 (1934).
19
U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 58 L. R. A. 436
(1902); Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 Atl. 64, 10 L. R. A. 550 (1891).
20 Colovas v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S. W. (2d) 820, 113, A. L. R. 881
(1937).
21
Middeke v. Balder, 198 Ill. 590, 64 N. E. 1002 (1902); Males v. Sovereign Camp W. W., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 70 S. W. 108 (1902); Fuller v. Linzee,
135 Mass. 468 (1883); McGowan v. Menkin, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877, 5
A. L. R. 794 (1918); Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420, 45 A. L. R.
618 (1926); Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Ia. 969, 204 N. W. 448, 43 A. L. R. 1340
(1925); Colovos v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S. W. (2d) 820 (1937); McKinney

v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938); In re Macklin's Will, 177
Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941).
22 Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 Atl. 64 (1891).
28 Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. S.
229 (1910); In re Burza's Estate, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. S. 248 (1934), 155
Misc. 44, 279 N. Y. S. 90 (1935); Morgan v. Sackett, 172 Misc. 855, 16 N. Y. S.
(2d) 583 (1939).
24 Colovos v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S. W. (2d) 820 (1937); Fuller v.
Linzee, 135 Mass. 468 (1883); McGowan v. Menkin, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E.
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Wills. The, disposition of property by testamentary instrument is
controlled primarily by the manifest intent of the testator. When he
and his devisee perish in a common disaster the court will construe the
whole will and carry into effect the declared intent of the testator so
long as it is clearly expressed and consistent with the general rules of
law. 25 The claims of the beneficiary to a devise in a testamentary instrument, which has not provided for simultaneous death, are usually
prejudiced-that is the gift is said to lapse-because the law raises a
presumption that when a devisee has died during the lifetime of the
testator, the testator does not intend the gift to be taken by any other
person. Except when there is a clear intent that the devisee is to take
26
in any event, this rule applies.
A purview of the cases reveals the decisions apparently fall into two
groups. Each group applies different principles but the results are the
same. The first group, consisting of a few cases, exclusively bases the
validity of the devise upon the import of the testator's intention manifest in his will. When it is doubtful whether the beneficiary is to take
the devise in a case of simultaneous death, the devise is held to have
lapsed and the property passes intestate to the representatives or heirs
of the testator. The second group, constituting the numerical majority
of decisions, first construes the intent of the testator, and in most cases
where the testator has failed to provide for simultaneous death, these
decisions place the onus of proving the survivorship of the devisee on
his representatives. From the lack of evidence as to the order of death,
the representatives fail in this proof and the property passes intestate as
previously explained.
The theory upon which the latter decisions are based is given in
In re Lott.27 The burden of proof rests on the party alleging survivorship because in the absence of any effectual disposition of the beneficiary's interest in the property, the next of kin is entitled to it by prima
facie title on the principle that the next of kin is to be preferred to
strangers. Therefore the person seeking to dispose the next of kin of
such title is bound to prove a perfect title in himself. The court adopts
28
the theory from an English case.
877, 5 A. L. R. 794 (1918); In re Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d)
706 (1941); McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E. (2d) 250 (1938); Sovereign Camp W. W. v. McKinnon, 48 Fed. (2d) 383 (1913). Contra: Watkins v.
Home Life &Accident Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S. W. 587 (1919); U. S. Casualty
Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 58 L. R. A. 436 (1902); Roberts v.

Hardin, 179 Ga. 114, 175, S. E. 362 (1934).
25 Pray v. Belt, 7 L. ed. 309 (1828).
26 In re Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918); In re Jenkin's Estate,
161 Misc. 359, 291 N. Y. S. 988 (1936), aff'd, 298 N. Y. S. 836 (1937).

27 65 Misc. 422, 121 N. Y. S. 1102 (1909).
28 Underwood v. Wing, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 633.
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The cases in which the testator made his intention sufficiently manifest to avoid the presumption of a lapse are noteworthy. In Young
Women's Christian Home v. French 29 the testatrix devised all of her
estate to her son with the limitation that one-half of the income thereof
was to go to her husband. It also provided that if she survived both
her husband and son all of her estate should go to the charity. In the
event her husband survived both herself and their son the estate was
also to go to the charity upon his death. The court reasoned that the
apparent intent of the testarix was to dispose of all of her property to
three devisees-in the event the husband and son failed to take upon
her death the Home was to get it-and thus the court held this intention sufficiently manifest to avoid a lapse of the gift to the Home. And
in Fitzgerald v. Ayres SO a husband and wife made separate wills both
devising their property to each other but if the primary devisee dieu
"before" the testator then their adopted son was to take under both
wills. The court felt that the intention of the testratix and testator was
to have the property pass to the adopted son, and not to third persons.
Here it seems the court was impressed by extrinsic evidence in construing the will. The court did not mention 'burden of proof', which most
courts have stressed in the cases of insurance policies and the cases involving wills, and concluded that these wills were to take effect as if
each contained only the bequest to their adopted son, citing In re Willbor as authority.
However, the court in In re Willbor 31 declared there was insufficient
intent manifest in either of the wills to avoid a lapse of the legacies. In
this case each of three sisters executed wills devising all of the testatrix's property to her two surviving sisters, or to the survivor of them,
and to their heirs and assigns forever, and also certain legacies to be
paid after all had died. All three sisters perished in a fire which consumed their home. There was no evidence of survivorship. The court
said there was insufficient time for the devises to take effect, since the
right of succession to the estates was determined as if death was simultaneous. Thus the wills stood as if they contained only the bequests
to the legatees subsequently named, and the balance of the property
(which did not vest) passed intestate. It is pertinent to note that the
court did not mention or suggest how this lapse could be avoided.
In re Jenkin's Estate 82 involves a will evidencing insufficient intent
to substitute or avoid a lapse of a devise. The will provided, "I give
and bequeath to my dear wife . . ., to her and her heirs forever the

sum of $15,000." These words were declared words of limitation and
not of substitution; therefore the gift lapsed. In order to effect a sub187 U. S. 401, 47 L. ed. 233 (1903).
30 179 S. W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915).

29

81 20 R. I. 126, 78 Am. St. Rep. 842, 51 L. R. A. 863 (1897).
82 161 Misc. 359, 291 N. Y. S. 988 (1936), aff'd, 298 N. Y. S. 836 (1937).
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stitution, the court suggested, the will must contain a "plain expression
of intention" for the courts will not strain an interpretation to keep
the will from lapsing. The plain expression of intention may be supplemented by extrinsic evidence-testator's kin, state of his affectionswhich from the facts it seems influenced this decision. The testator's
children by a former wife were contesting the devisee's collateral heirs'
rights to the gift and by construing the terms to be words of limitation,
thus causing the legacy to lapse, the property then passed to the children
of the former wife as in intestacy.33
It is another matter when the testator has had the foresight to provide expressely in his will that in the event he and his devisee perish
in a comman disaster with insufficient evidence as to who survived, it
is to be presumed that he predeceased his devisee, because such express
provision has been upheld by Justice Cardozo, in In re Fowles, as avoiding a lapse.8 4 By circumscribing a lapse the bequest stands and the
representatives of the deceased devisee take under the testamentary
provision. This appears to be the only case to date in which the testator has expressly anticipated in his will the death of the devisee and
himself in a common disaster. Notwithstanding this dearth of supporting authorities the decision is consonant with sound reason for the testator has taken all of the means at his command to show the disposition
of his property as he wishes.
The cases constituting the numerical weight of authority, where there
is no express provision in a will with regard to simultaneous death, hold
that since there is no presumption of survivorship or of simultaneous
death where the testator and the devisee perish in a common disaster,
the burden of proving survivorship is upon the devisee's representatives,
who by the nature of the case fail in such proof. Consequently the
gift falls and passes as in intestacy.3 5
The case of Carpenter v. Severin 36 serves as a good illustration of
this group of cases. The issue concerns the disposition of the testator's
property. A husband and wife made mutual wills without specific provision for simultaneous death. They perished in a common disaster.
Held, since there was no presumption of survivorship in a common
disaster, the burden of proof was on the party alleging survivorship.
ss See: In re Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941), for
dicta in accord.
34 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918).
35 Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Ia. 969, 204 N. W. 448 (1925); In re Kinimey's
Estate, 326 Pa. 33, 191 Atl. 47 (1937); In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939); In re Lott, 65 Misc. 422, 121 N. Y. S.1102 (1909);
In re Burza's Estate, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. S.248 (1934), 155 Misc. 44, 279
N. Y. S. 90 (1935); St. John v. Andrews Institute for Girls, 191 N. Y. 254, 83
N. E. 981 (1908); In re Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706

(1941).

86 201 Ia. 969, 204 N. W. 448 (1925).
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Thus simultaneous death of the testator and devisee prevented either
sets of heirs from receiving the benefit of the devise to their ancestor;
although, it did not prevent the respective heirs from succeeding to individually owned property at the death of their ancestor. Plaintiffs in
this case pleaded a statute providing: .'if a devisee dies before the testator" the result is "his heirs shall inherit the property devised to him."
The court refused to find that simultaneous death cases came within the
provisions of this statute. However, for an interesting comparison, a
recent New York case, In re Macklin's Will, 3 7 under a statute similar

to the Iowa statute, alters the common law so that the devisee's wife
and children take the devise made to said devisee. Aside from the fact
that the New York statute more clearly favors the blood heirs of the
devisee, the cases are distinguishable from the standpoint that in the
New York case the devisee's immediate family survived him, whereas
in the Iowa case the collateral heirs survived.
When the property disposed in a will is held by entirety, from the
few cases on this subject it unanimously appears that neither spouse is
seized of any interest that can be disposed of by a will which contains
no provision as to simultaneous death. Each owns the whole estate
subject only to the irrevocable right of survivorship of the other spouse.
And this is true whether there is one unilateral will or whether there
are mutual or reciprocal wills. 38 The estate in such case is held to pass
to the respective spouse's heirs either on the theory of proportionate
contribution 39 or by presumption of law, namely fifty per cent to each
40
group.
Now the salient point evident in the wills involved in these cases is
that there is no express provision made to take effect in the event of the
simultaneous death of the testator and devisee. Furthermore, a statement by the court in the Strong case emphatically implies that if the
testator provides expressly for the disposition of his share of the extinguished entirety, upon the demise of both he and his wife in a common disaster, the court would honor his testamentary directions. The
statement of the court follows: "Simultaneous death not having been
provided for, portions of these will

. . .

have failed of effect; with the

result that some of the husband's residuary estate into which his contributed interest in the extinguished entirety necessarily fell, must now
be regarded as having become the property of his heir as in intestacy."
Simultaneous death frustrates or extinguishes the estate by entirety;
shares or interests alone remain. It seems reasonable that the husband
87

177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (1941).
Levenson v. Levenson, 229 App. Div. 402, 242 N. Y. S. 165 (1930); In
re Strong's Will, 177 Misc. 445, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939).
38

39 In re Strong's Will, 177 Misc. 445, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939).
40 McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509, 18 A. L. R. 103 (1921);
Vaughan v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937); In re Strong's Will, 177
Misc. 445, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939).

NOTES
or wife, or both, can make a testamentary disposition of their respective
shares in the extinguished entirety as each desires, so long as they expressly stipulate that such disposition is to take effect in the event of
simultaneous death. For instance the testator and testatrix in a joint
will can devise their shares in case of simultaneous death to her invalid
mother; or, they can devise their respective shares to different persons:
his share to his brother, and her share to her mother. It seems logical
that similar dispositions can be made validly in separate or individual
wills, subject to the necessity of expressly stipulating that the said devise be effective if simultaneous death occurs. Similarly, the one spouse
alone can dispose validly of his share of the extinguished entirety, in
the event of a simultaneous death, so that his share would pass testate;
while his wife's share would pass intestate, (assuming a fifty-fifty division of the estate by entirety) either because of the failure to provide
expressly for simultaneous death in the event she. has executed a will,
or because she has failed to execute a will altogether. Yet, when the
share or shares of the extinguished entirety are determined on the theory
of contribution, one spouse might feasibly have nothing to devise. Thus
where the wife makes a devise of her "share" it would be void, since she
had not contributed to the creation of the entirety.
In passing it may be said that a party desiring to have his share go
to a certain relative or friend, in the event the entirety is extinguished
by simultaneous death, he might set up a trust for this purpose. It
must be noted, however, that the title could not vest in the trustee at
the time of the execution of the trust agreement for it would be voidneither spouse has a moiety that he can convey unless the other spouse
join in such conveyance. 41 On the other hand this would not be necessary if the one spouse sets up a trust to take effect in the event of the
simultaneous death of both himself and his wife. Title in this instance
would not pass to the -trustee until the entirety has been extinguished
by the simultaneous death.
Uniform Simultaneous Death Statutes. In 1941 Indiana, among
other states, adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.4 2 The design of this law is to correct the injustices resulting from applications
of the common law rule in certain situations. It is our purpose to interpret in what measure the common law has been affected. Unfortunately there have been no decisions since the statute's enactment to
determine the extent of the influence of the act.
"Where title to property or devolution depends upon priority or
death and tfiere is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died
otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each shall be disposed
of as if he had survived, except as provided otherwise in this act," con41
42

McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509, 18 A. L. R. 103 (1921).
Burn's Stat. Anno. Supp. §§ 6-2356, 2363 (1941)
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stitutes the first provision of the statute. This means that in the event,
for example, as in several common law cases, 43 of a husband and wife
perishing in a common disaster without evidence as to the order of
death, the individually owned property of the husband will devolve
upon his heirs and, the individually owned property of the wife will devolve upon her heirs. Under the saving clause, "This act shall not apply in the case of wills, living trusts, deeds, or contracts of insurance
wherein the provision has been made for distribution of property different from the provisions of this act," the common law holdings are unaffected where the testator manifestly intends that the gift shall not
lapse upon his perishing in a common disaster with his devisee. 4 4 But,
in view of the presumption this in effect raises in favor of the testator
having survived as to his property, the surest means of avoiding the
failure of a legacy or bequest would be to expressly provide for the
contingency of simultaneous death in the will; as was done in the case
of In re Fowles 45 previously noted; or, as suggested herein, in the
case of property held by entirety.
The next section provides that where there are two or more beneficiaries designated to take successively by reason of survivorship, and
they perish in a common disaster, the property shall be divided into as
many equal portions as there are successive beneficiaries. And, these
portions are to be distributed respectively to those who would have
46
taken in the event each beneficiary had survived. Fleming v. Grimes
appears to be a case within the compass of this proVision. Several of
the beneficiaries and the insured perished in a tornado; the heirs of
the insured were held entitled to the proceeds of the policy. Of course
under this provision of the statute the common law rule as advanced in
the Fleming case is changed; each beneficiaries' representatives take a
portion of the gift. Presumably in carrying out the expressed intent
of the insured the statute brings about an equitable result.
Section three stipulates that where the property is held in joint tenancy, and the tenants die simultaneously, the property is distributed
one-half as if one had survived and one-half as if the other had survived.
If there are more than two joint tenants and all die simultaneously, the
property is distributed in the proportion that one bears to the whole
number of joint tenants. Since estates by entirety devolve in the same
manner as joint tenancies in so far as survivorship is concerned, this
statute by implication applies to estates by entirety. This statute does
43 McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 572, 108 Atl. 196 (1919); In re Sweeney's
Estate, 78 Pa. S. Ct. 417 (1922).
44 In re Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611. (1918); Fitzgerald v. Ayres,
179 S. W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915); Young Women's Christian Home v.
French, 187 U. S.401, 47 L. ed. 233 (1903).
45 In re Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918).
46 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420, 45 A. L. R. 618 (1926).
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not alter the common law rule as advanced in McGhee v. Henry 47 and
Vaughan v. Borland 48 but it does change the common law rule based
on contribution as advanced in In re Strong's Will 49 and In re Kaup50

per.

Section four provides that where the insured and his beneficiary, in
life or accident insurance policy cases, die simultaneously, the proceeds
of the policy are distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary. This does not alter the common law majority holding 51 but
it removes argument of vested or expectant interests. And as in civil
law cases, this raises a presumption but not on the grounds of physical
qualifications.
The last section, previously cited, permits express exceptions to be
made to this statute.
Warren A. Deahl.

INTERVENING RIGHTS IN REISSUED PATENTS.-A patent is divided
into two parts, namely, the specifications which disclose what the patented invention is, and the claims which constitute the only legal protection accorded the patentee. In other words, the specifications may
disclose a very broad patent, but if the claims are narrowed in various
particulars, the protection accorded by the patent is restricted to the
narrowing limitations of the claims. Sometimes the original claims of a
patent are defective for some reason, and in that case the statute under
certain conditions permits a reissue patent to be secured. This is covered by 35 U. S. C. A., 64. "Whenever any patent is wholly or partly
inoperative.., if the error has arisen by inadvertence, accident or mistake... the commissioner shall cause a patent for the same invention,
and in accordance with the corrected specifications, to be reissued to
the patentee, for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent."
In general, there are three classes of valid reissues, namely:
1. A reissue correcting ambiguous or otherwise defective descriptions in a patent without changing its scope.
2. A narrowed reissue, designed to eliminate matter in the original
patent, which the patentee had no right to claim as new. In this case
the reissue asks for an invention which is narrower in scope than that
claimed in the original patent.
47
48
49
50
51

144
234
177
125
228

Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509, 18 A. L. R. 103 (1921).
Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937).
Misc. 445, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544 (1939).
N. Y. S. 878, 94 N. E. 1095 (1910).
Mo. App. 135, 58 S. W. (2d) 787 (1933).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
3. Broadened reissue, granted where the claims of the original patent are narrower than the actual invention of the patentee, as described
in the specifications of the original patent. The reissue's broadened
claims, however, can include only what is disclosed in the specifications
of the original patent. Broadened reissues are not expressly authorized
by the statute but have been expressly approved by the Supreme Court
in many cases. In general, a broadened reissue must be applied for
within two years from the date of the original patent.' Therefore, in
considering intervening rights under broadened reissues, it should be
particularly noted whether the reissue is actually applied for within
two years. If not, then the case is entirely different from that when the
broadened reissue was so applied for.
Intervening rights by their nature can arise only in the case of a
broadened reissue. This doctrine of intervening rights relates to the
rights which a person may acquire by acts committed prior to application for a broadened reissue, which acts did not infringe the claims of
the original patent, but do infringe the broadened claims of the reissue. In this connection it should be noted that intervening rights are
a matter of equitable consideration and the court grants them in order
to do equity. There are several groups of cases wherein the doctrine is
frequently advanced, and should be carefully distinguished. Where the
original failure to make the claims sufficiently broad is not the result of
inadvertence, 2 where the patentee has been guilty of laches,3 or where
the application for the reissue embraces a different invention from
that originally disclosed, 4 obviously no right of reissue exists.
Many of the problems with regard to intervening rights are unsettled. There are roughly five questions that might be put forward:
1. When must intervening rights be acquired, before the application for the reissue or before the reissue is actually granted? Most of
the cases say that they must be acquired before the application for the
reissue. The unmistakable inference from the decisions is that action
after the date of application would be insufficient. Even where there
has been actual reliance by the defendant before the application is filed
it is believed the case is inapposite. The intervenor knows as a matter
of law, and almost certainly as a matter of fact, that the patentee has
1 Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. Ed. 783 (1882). The
statute itself does not specify the time within which application for a reissue must
be made.
2 Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. Ed. 783 (1882); Coon
v. Wilson, 113 U. S. 268; Dunham v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 154 U. S. 103, 38 L. Ed.
924 (1894), 28 L. Ed. 963 (1885).
s Supreme Mfg. Co. v. Security Mfg. Co., 299 Fed. 65 (1924), certiorari
denied, 266 U. S. 614, 69 L. Ed. 469 (1924); Otis Elevator Co. v. Atlantic Ele-

vator Co., 47 F. (2d) 545 (1931).
4 Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. Ed. 783 (1882); Parker
& Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87, 31 L. Ed. 100 (1887).
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a right to a reissue. 5 Hence any reliance upon the limited scope of the
original claims seems unreasonable, at least within the two year period
during which the right to a reissue presumptively exists.
2. Do intervening rights stop as of the date of the application for
the reissue or do they continue throughout the life of the patent? The
cases thus far decided by the various circuit courts of appeal have established certain rules as applied to various situations. Clearly the
patentee, by his reissue, loses all rights to an accounting for the intervening period.6 Where the defendant has constructed certain expensive machines which are now covered by the patent, the presumed
license permits him to continue to use the machines already built and
to sell the products thereof.7 And where the defendant had on hand a
large supply of a product brought by the reissue into the scope of the
patent, he was allowed to dispose of that supply.8 At least one circuit
court case has held that, where the defendant has built up a large business in the manufacture and sale of the device, in reliance upon the apparent dedications in the patent, his license permitted him to continue
to manufacture and sell.9
3. How broad is the nature of intervening rights? Would the defendant have a right to build new plants or would he be limited to
production in plants already existing at the time of the reissue? In the
most recent case decided by the Supreme Court, Sontag Chain Stores
Co., Ltd. v. National Nut Company of California,10 the court gave
intervening rights only with regard to machines manufactured and operated after grant of the original patent and before application for the
reissue. This has been the trend of the cases leading up to the Nut
Company case.
4. Are intervening rights granted only where the patent owner,
knowing of the defendant's actions, attempted to enlarge his patent by
virtue of the reissue so as to cover the defendant's actions? There is
considerable basis in the cases for arguing that since intervening rights
are merely an equitable grant, they are restricted to a case where the
owner of a patent actually knew of the defendant's conduct, which did
not violate the original patent, and the owner therefore took out the
reissue in order to cover what the defendant was doing. Although this
question is not discussed in detail in the National Nut Company case,
the court did point out in two or three instances that "the enlarged
claims were presented with knowledge of the accused machine and a
Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (1928).
6 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198; 38 S. Ct. 104, 62 L.
Ed. 240 (1917).
7 Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (1928).
8 Bull Dog Floor Clip Co. v. Munson Mfg. Co., 19 F. (2d) 43 (1927).
9 Autopiano Co. v. American Player Action Co., 222 F. 276 (1915); Christman v. New York Air Brake Co., 1 Fed. Supp. 211 (1928).
10 310 U. S. 281, 60 S. Ct. 961, 84 L. Ed. 1204 (1940).
5
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definite purpose to include it." Defendant's operations in the field have
often motivated the patentee in seeking his reissue. 1 ' Here the finding may rest on a showing that there was no inadvertence, accident or
mistake in the original grant, for such a showing makes more reasonable the defendant's reliance upon the apparently intended dedication.
The fact that the patentee, by his reissue seeks to appropriate as part
of his invention subsequent improvements in the art does not affect the
legality or illegality of the reissue 12 but is relevant to the issue of
estoppel. 13
5. What conduct of an infringer is sufficient to create intervening
rights? It is certain that a substantial investment in the industry made
during the intervening period is the requirement. 14 Seemingly, mere
laboratory experiments are insufficient to raise an estoppel,' 5 because
in such a case no cause of action accrued prior to the reissue, and the
statute applies only to "causes arising thereafter." So also is payment
of application fees for another patent, while plaintiff's patent was pending, without further investment. 16
W. I. Rafferty.

LESSOR'S LIABILITY FOR TENANT'S INjURIES; BASED UPON AN IM-

PLIED

HABITABILITY AGREEMENT, WHERE

THE PREMISES

ARE LET

FURNISHED.-In view of the fact that many defense workers and their
families are obliged by circumstances, too obvious to mention, to seek
shelter and housing in poorly furnished and repaired apartments and
houses, it would be well to inquire into the lessor's liability for personal
injuries to the lessee's person or to his family and invitees for injuries
due to defective furnishings and appurtenances in such dwellings.
A leading recent case on this subject is Hacker v Nitschke,' where,
in an action for damages for personal injuries received when the lessee
in using a ladder to ascend to the upper berth of a bed fell, the court
held for the tenant. The fall was the result of loose screws fastening
the clamps on the top of the ladder, which clamps held the ladder to
the top of the upper berth. The Massachusetts court, in holding for
the tenant, relied on the theory of Ingalls v Hobbs, 2 saying by way of
11 Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (1928).
12 White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47.
'3
General Refractories Co. v. Ashland Fire Brick Co., 15 F. (2d) 215 (1926),
(Reversed on other grounds - above cited.)
14 Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. General Refractories Co., 27 F. (2d) 744 (1928).
15 City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F. (2d) 577 (1934).
16 American Automotoneer Co. v. Porter, 232 F. 456 (1916).
1 39 N. E. (2nd.) 644; ........
Mass .........
; 139 A. L. R. 259 (1942).
2 156 Mass. 348; 31 N. E. 286; 16 L. R. A. 51; -32 Am. St. Rep. 460 (1892).
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dicta, that one who lets for a short term of a few days, weeks or
months, 3 a fully furnished house supposedly equipped for immediate
occupancy as a dwelling without the necessity of any fitting up or
furnishing by, the tenant, impliedly agrees that the house and its appurtenances are suitable for occupation at that time.
The present case is not taken out of the principle of Ingalls v Hobbs,
supra, because of the fact that the tenant brought some bed linen, silverware, and a few other articles of personal convenience, nor did the fact
that the tenant was shown through the house before she leased it prevent the application of the principle, at least as to such defects as could
be found on ordinary examination, of the house. In the present case,
the tenant was entitled to go before the jury on the basis of a breach
of contract and her rights did not depend upon proof of any negligence
of the defendant.
One of the leading English cases on this question is Smith v Marrable, 4 which was affirmed by Ingalls v Hobbs, supra. In the English
case there was an implied condition in the letting of a furnished house
at a watering place for a term of five or six weeks that it should be
ready for occupation. In so construing, the court said that the lessee
might repudiate his lease. This doctrine was supported by the later
English cases of Wilson v Finch-Hatton,5 and Bird v Greville. 6
In Wilson v Finch-Hatton, supra, Pollock, B., said, "that when a
person takes a furnished house for a brief period of time it is clear that
he expects to find it reasonably fit for occupation from the day on which
he intended to enter and the lessor was aware that this was the view
entertained by the tenant. If this was not so, what limit could be
imposed to the time during which the tenant might be kept out of possession and how long would he have to wait while the value of his
tenancy was still diminishing?" The rent paid for the house was not
merely rent for the use of the realty but a sum paid for the accommodation afforded by the use of the house with all the appurtenances and
contents during the period for which it was taken. It is not enough
that a landlord in letting a furnished house honestly believes that the
house is in a fit state for habitation, the house itself must be reasonably
habitable. However, in Charsley v Jones, 7 the court held an implied
8 Young v Povich, 121 Me. 141; 116 At. 26; 29 A. L. R. 48 (1922) where
there was a lease of a dwelling for a temporary purpose which raised an implied

warranty that the dwelling was reasonably safe and fit for use and habitation.
The lease, for eight months, of a furnished apartment at a summer resort, was

for a temporary purpose within the aforesaid rule, but it was for the jury to
decide whether such a lease under all circumstances and conditions was a lease
for a temporary purpose.
4 11 Mees and W. 5; 152 Eng. Reprint 693 (1843).
5 L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 336; 46 L. J. Exch. N. S. 489 (1877).
0 1 Cab. and El. 317 (1884).
7 5 Times L. R. 412; 53 J. P. 281 (1889).
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covenant for fitness for habitation arising from the letting of a furnished
house does not extend to the external conditions not attributable to the
fault of the lessor, such as odors from adjacent premises, 8 or to a condition not existing at the time the lease was made, but which came
into being after the title to the leasehold premises had vested under an
executed lease, though before the commencement of the term, 9 and there
is no implied agreement that they shall continue fit for habitation
during the term. 1o In Charsley v Jones, supra, it was held that the
tenant was entitled to recover the rent paid and such other expenses
as he was put to by reason of the sickness in his family, where there
was a breach of an implied undertaking that the premises were fit for
human habitation.
The law implies, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a
warranty by the landlord as to the habitability and fitness of the
premises. This warranty, it is said, is not only one springing by just
and necessary implication from the contract and lease but it is a warranty tending in the most striking manner to the public good and
preservation of public health and therefore should be extended rather
than restricted.
It is to be noted, that the lessee may, upon discovery of an existing
fact that would dispel the implied warranty, repudiate his lease on the
ground that the premises were not reasonably safe for human habitation. Collin v Hopkins, 11 held that where the previous occupant of
the leased premises had had pulmonary tuberculosis, the lessee was entitled to treat such fact as a breach of an implied warranty that the
premises were reasonably fit for habitation at the date set for occupancy.
In Hacker v Nitschke, supra, the implied agreement covered furnishings and a breach of the agreement yielded tort damages for personal injuries, notwithstanding the fact that the action was for a breach
of contract. In considering the holding in the present case, it must be
observed that the house was completely furnished and that the term
of the lease was short, so that it was readily seen that the lessee was
anxious to take immediate possession of the premises and that the lessor
understood the wishes of the lessee as such.
There are good reasons why an implied habitability covenant should
apply to one who hires a furnished room or a furnished house for a
few days, a few weeks, or even a few months. Its fitness for immediate
8

where
which
0
A. L.
10

11

Franklin v Brown, 118 N. Y. 110; 6 L. R. A. 770; 23 N. E. 126 (1889);
an odor nuisance existed on adjacent premises belonging to a stranger of
neither the landlord nor the tenant was aware when the lease was made.
Edwards v McLean, 122 N. Y. 302; 26 N. E. 483; 4 A. L. R. 1459; 13
R. 818; 29 A. L. R. 52; 34 A. L. R. 711 (1890).
Sorson v Roberts, 2 Q. B. 395; 65 L. J. Q. R. S. 37 (1895).
2 K. B. 617; 34 A. L. R. 703 (1923).
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use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments is a far more
important element entering into the contract than when there is a mere
lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term, a house provided
with all the furnishings and appointments necessary for immediate
residence, may be supposed to contract in reference to a well understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a place of habitation. An im-.
portant part of what the hirer pays for is, the opportunity to enjoy it
without delay and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is
very difficult and often impossible for one to determine on inspection
whether the house and its furnishings are fit for the use for which they
are immediately wanted and the doctrine of caveat emptor, which is
ordinarily applicable to a lease of real estate, would often work injustice if applied to cases of this kind. It would be unreasonable to hold,
under such circumstances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree
that what he is letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition
at that time.
Timothy M. Green.

RIGHT OF A SURETY ON A GOVERNMENT BUILDING CONTRACT TO
PRIORITY ON PROGRESS PAYMENTS AND RETAINED PERCENTAGES HELD
BY THE GoVERNENT.-Under Fed. statute 1 anyone entering into a
contract with the United States for the construction or repairs on any
public building or work is required to execute a penal bond, with good
and sufficient securities, with the additional obligation that such a contrator shall promptly pay all laborers and material men who supply him
with labor or material for the contract. Similar statutes place contractors under a like burden in all states.
Payments on many such projects are made as the work progresses,
with the government retaining a certain percentage until the completion
of the contract. In case of default on the part of the contractor the
government may either complete the work or demand that the surety
complete it. If the surety is called upon to complete the work the
question arises as to whether or not the surety is entitled to a priority
in the progress payments due and unpaid, and to the retained percentages over general creditors and assignees of the contractor. There is
no question but that the surety is entitled to all future progress payments as they become due, but a question arises as to his superior rights
to the retained percentages and to any progress payments which may
have been due the original contractor at the time of default. It is the
rights of the surety to these due, but unpaid, progress payments and
1

40 U. S. C. A. 270.
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retained percentages as to general creditors or assignees of the original
contractor that we will discuss herein.
The general rule as to retained percentages is found in PrairieState
Bank v. United States.2 In this case one Hitchcock was a surety on
a building contract entered into by Sundberg & Co. with the United
States. After beginning the contract Sundberg & Co. borrowed money
from the Prairie State Bank and assigned money to be due from the
United States. Whether the money borrowed was used to pay debts
arising from the building contract was not proven. Sundberg defaulted,
and Hitchcock completed the work. The court held that Hitchock had
not only a right of subrogation to the same rights of Sundberg & Co.
to the retained percentages, but he also was subrogated to the same
rights the United States would have had to it had the United States
completed the work itself. On the other hand the bank was a mere
volunteer and under no compulsion to loan its money.
In City of Texarkana v. F. W. Offenhauser & Co.8 two general creditors of a contractor holding a contract with the city attempted to
garnishee retained percentages held by the city. The contractor had
defaulted, and the surety had completed the work. The city had paid
the retained percentages to the surety. In holding for the surety the
court held that the surety on a contractor's bond who completes the
contract in accordance with its terms, upon default of his principal, is
subrogated to the rights of the obligees in the bond to the extent necessary to reimburse himself and has an equity in the funds due the contractor, under the terms of the contract, superior to that of any general
creditor, assignee, or one who loans money to the contractor to pay for
labor or materials necessary to complete the work.
In Street v PacificIndemnity Company 4 a surety on a road contract
who was bourid to pay materialmen and laborers, was held subrogated
to the rights of laborers and materialmen who had filed stop notices
against the road fund, as against the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy,
where the contractor had defaulted and the surety had completed the
contract and had collected from the contractee the amount due for the
performance of the contract. In this case the surety had expended
more than such amount in completing the work and in paying for labor
and materials. This decision was on the theory that the rights of the
surety relate back to the time of the original contract and not to the
time of paying laborers and materialmen. In a recent case, United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. John R. Alley and Company,5 the
court ruled that a surety on a state highway contractor's bond who had
2 164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142, 41 Fed. 412 (1896).
3 182 Ark. 140, 31 S. W. (2d) 140 (1940).
4 61 Fed. 106 (1932).
5 34 F. Supp. 604 (1940).
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paid claims for the labor and material was subrogated to the rights of
the laborers and materialmen to funds in the possession of the State
Highway Commission, and the surety's lien upon such funds was
superior to liens asserted by bank for an amount allegedly due on contractor's notes covering a loan, and by general creditors for merchandise
purchased by, and for services rendered to, the contractor.
While on the question of retained percentages the great majority
of decisions follow the rule laid down in PrairieState Bank v. United
States,6 that the surety has prior claim to such retained percentages,
some courts attempt to distinguish in the case of one who loans to the
contractor for the specific purpose of paying materialmen and laborers.
In this case the loan is used to reduce the liability of the surety, and
the contention is raised that such a creditor should have a superior
claim to that of the surety. Such cases fall into two categories: those
in which the creditor takes an assignment from the contractor on the
retained percentages, and those in which the creditor takes an assignment from the laborers and materialmen.
In those cases where the creditor merely took an assignment from
the contractor the great majority of cases hold that, as against the
surety, the creditor has an inferior right. Thus in Riverside State Bank
v. Wentz 7 the court held that a surety on a contractor's bond, who had
paid the claims of materialmen, became subrogated to their rights, and
that the rights so acquired by the surety in the retained percentages
were superior to the rights of a bank which had loaned money to the
contractor for use in the prosecution of the work and had taken an
assignment of the proceeds from estimates to become due to the contractor.
A few cases, which give a party loaning money to the contractor for
the purpose of meeting obligations to laborers and materialmen priority
over a surety, do so because the surety has acquiesced in the assignment.
Thus in First National Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company8 the court said: "the surety company having by such arrangement induced the plaintiff to make the advances to the contractors
in reliance upon the agreement of the contractor consented to and agreed
by the surety, it would not be consistent with equity and good conscience to permit the surety company to collect and retain a portion
of the moneys so assigned and hypothecated to the bank to reimburse
it for money so loaned and which remained unpaid."
Other cases holding for the creditor as against the surety do so only
if the creditor was obliged to make the loan. Such a ruling was fol6 164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142,41 Fed. 412 (1896).
7 34 F. Supp. 419 (1929).
8 127 Ore. 147, 271 P. 57 (1928).
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lowed in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Wurtz. 9 Here there was a
construction contract with a bond for performance. There was a contract indemnifying the surety. The arrangement between the creditor
bank and the contractor was that all money received by the contractor
on the contract should be deposited in an account from which no money
should be drawn except for labor and materials used on the construction
contract; and that, if such deposits were insufficient to carry on the
work the bank would make advances to the contractor, on his notes,
crediting such to his account. The arrangement with the bank was
performed by both parties. The court held the equity of the bank
superior to that of the surety because its advances had, pro tanto, discharged the liabilities of the principal and surety and because the bank
was bound by contract to finance the principal.
Where the party loaning money to the contractor directly paid the
laborers and materialmen and took assignments from them some courts
have given such a party a superior claim to that of a surety. 10 The
courts so holding have hinged their ruling on the fact that the surety
is in no way injured. If the party loaning to the contractor had not
done so the surety would have been liable to laborers and materialmen
for that additional amount.
Many courts in giving preference to the assignee bank have emphasized the fact that if the bank were not given preference it would discourage such loans, and thus not only generally hamper the financing
of such building contracts but would increase the number of failures
on the part of contractors thus increasing the liability of sureties.
The great majority of cases will not allow an assignee to obtain a
claim superior to that of the surety. A very recent decision in New
York followed this general rule. 1
An examination of cases holding both for and against the surety
shows that many courts ignore the rights of the surety arising from the
very nature of the suretyship relation and make it a problem of prior
assignments. Some of these hold that the surety's assignment is from
the time he is called upon to pay and is thus later in time than the
assignment of the creditor assignee. Other courts hold the assignment
is from the time of the making of the contract and is thus prior in time.
The better reasoned cases, however, emphasize the fact that the surety's
rights arlise by subrogation, and that a specific assignment, although
often made, adds nothing to the surety's rights, but that the surety
had a prior right dating from the time of his becoming surety.
0

145 Minn. 438, 177 N. W. 664 (1920).
Third Nat. Bank v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 65 Fed. 548 (1933);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 237, 34 S. Ct.
88, 58 L. Ed. 200 (1913).
11 Century Cement Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 332 (1942).
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When we turn to "progress payments" earned by the contractor before default but still in the hands of the contractee we find a greater
split of authority. Many cases hold that the rule laid down in Prairie
State Nat. Bank v. United States 12
applies to progress payments as
well as to retained percentages. This case emphasizes the fact that the
surety is not only subrogated to the rights of the principal but he is also
subrogated to the rights which the contractee has to any securities
which it can assert against the principal. If the creditor completes the
work himself he is entitled to all funds still in his hands necessary to
complete the work. The surety is likewise so entitled. This decision
has been frequently adhered to and in a recent case 13 the court stated:
"where a surety of a construction contractor, upon the contractor's default, completes the contract, and the contractee has funds in his hands
earned by the contractor, the surety is entitled to be subrogated to the
rights which the contractee, upon the contractor's default, could assert
against such funds, to the extent necessary to reimburse the surety for
the outlay made to complete the contract. This right to the funds embraces not only retained percentages, but other funds earned by the
contractee. It extends to any earned funds held by the contractee,
because on default by the contractor, the contractee upon completion
of the contract itself, could recoup its loss from any funds in its hands
earned by the contractor."
In First Nat. Bank of Seattle v. City Trust Safe Deposit & Surety
of Philadelphia14 the bond of a contractor was conditioned for the
completion of the contract and the payment of all claims against the
contractor for labor and materials. The contract provided for monthly
payments of 70 per cent of the estimates as the work progressed, and
the retention by the city of 30 per cent until after completion of the
contract, to secure the payment of laborers and materialmen. The
contractor abandoned the work, having earned about $3,900, which was
unpaid, and leaving outstanding claims for labor and materials amounting to $3,100. The city called upon the surety, which assumed and
completed the contract, paying all claims against the contractor for
labor and materials. Prior to the abandonment of the work, the contractor had borrowed money from a bank, and assigned to it all sums
to becofiie due from the city during certain months, and the bank had
notified the city of the assignment. The court held that the surety was
subrogated, to the extent necessary to protect it from loss, to all the
rights which the city might have asserted against the fund in its hands,
and that such rights were not limited to the 30 per cent, reserved under
164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142, 44 Fed. 412 (1896).
13 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit v. Fed. Nat. Bank, 112 F. (2d) 692
(1940).
14 First Nat. Bank of Seattle v. City Trust Safe Deposit of Philadelphia, 114
F. 529 (1902).
12
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the contract, but extended to the entire fund, which the city might,
notwithstanding the assignment, have declared forfeited, and applied to
reduce its damages, if it had been compelled to complete the work,
which it must have done, but for the action of the surety. The surety's
right was superior in law and equity to that of the bank under its assignment, by which it took no greater right than the contractor, as
15
against either the city or surety.
There is authority, however, which refuses to accept the PrairieState
Bank Case 16 as being in point in cases involving progress payments.
These courts definitely distinguish between progress payments and retained percentages, and, while granting the right of the surety to retained percentages, refuse to admit his right to priority in progress payments.
The leading case in so distinguishing between progress payments is
Kane v. 1st Nat. Bank.17 This case, however, while dogmatically declaring that the contractor is entitled to progress payments over the
surety and that they constitute no trust for the surety, cites no authority to substantiate its holding. This case has, nevertheless, been frequently cited, and forms the basis for similar rulings in the case of
Third Nat. Bank v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Compalny.18 In the recent case of Town of River Junction v. Maryland Casualty Company,19
this decision was dissented to by Judge Hutcheson who clearly showed
the applicability of the Prairie Statecase to the facts involved herein.
In examining the cases we see that the confusion which has arisen
on this subject stems from two misconceptions. On the question of the
rights of a party loaning money to the principal to pay laborers and
materialmen and taking assignments from the contractor over the
surety, the difficulty arises because of tracing the surety's rights to an
assignment rather than to the very relationship of principal and surety.
Some courts by dating the assignment back to the time of the surety
contract arrive at the same result as they would by properly tracing
the surety's rights to the surety contract. Other courts, however, by
saying that the surety's assignment accrues at the time he is called
upon to pay, arrive at a verdict adverse to the rights of the surety.
It is often true that, as the court pointed out in River Junction v.
Maryland Casualty Co.,2 0 loans to the principal for payment of laborers
and materialmen will prevent bankruptcy of the principal and lessen
the liability. In such a case, however, the party making the loan should,
15
16

Lacy v. Maryland Casualty Co., 32 F. (2d) 48 (1929).
164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142, 41 Fed. 412 (1896).

17

56 F. (2d) 534 (1932).

18

65 F. (2d) 540 (1933).
110 F. (2d) 278 (1940).
110 F. (2d) 278 (1940).
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instead of relying upon merely an assignment from the principal, also
obtain permission from the surety to make the loan and obtain priority
21
over the surety to that amount.
The other point of confusion, the attempt to have different rules
applicable to retained percentages and progress payments, arises from
a misunderstanding of the dual relationship of the surety relation under
the statutes regulating government building. Laborers and materialmen
have an action against the principal and against the surety. Thus the
surety is, upon paying, subrogated to the rights of the materialmen and
laborers against the principal. The materialmen and laborers have'another possibility of recovery, however. They have an action against
the property into which went their labor and materials.2 2 Thus in a
very true sense the contractee is a surety for the contractor for his own
exoneration. By paying the materialmen and laborers, the original
surety is subrogated to all the rights of the contractee, and not merely
to the retained percentages, one of the purposes of which is to create
23
a fund for the reimbursement of the surety.
In view of the peculiar nature of the suretyship contract the surety
should have a superior right not only to retained percentages but also
to progress payments earned but uncollected. The case of PrairieState
Bank v. United States 24 should apply to retained percentages and progress payments indiscriminately, and the surety who is called upon to
answer for his principal should have a preferred status not only as
against general creditors but also as against assignees of the principal.
Bernard F. Grainey.

THEx RIGHT oF PnivAcy.-Surely today in the midst of a world conflict we are all aware of political, social, and economic changes that affect
our daily mode of living. Such changes bring with them new complexities that tend to enhance man's relations with his fellownian and resultant exigencies arise for the creation of new legal rights. Society has
always foregone such changes, and fifty-two years ago,' though the
metamorphosis was not so pronounced, such changes were taking place.
The "gay 90's" saw America with its large cities, and its peoples
congregating in closer proximity to each other. New inventions flooded
21 First Nat. Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 127 Ore. 147,
271" . 57 (1928).
22 164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142, 41 Fed. 412 (1896).
23 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Nat. Bank, 122 F. (2d) 692 (1940).
24

164 U. S. 227, 17 S. Ct. 142, 41 Fed. 412 (1896).

I The year 1890 is generally thought of as the "birthday" of the right of
privacy.
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the markets and industry was quick to capitalize on such helpmates
whenever it was practical to do so, newspaper publishers encouraged the
growth of "sensationalism" in their publications, .and advertising was
gaining recognition as an important ally of business. These changes
through their various ramifications, tended to lay bare-as sacrificial of
offerings-the personalities of people. Photographs of individuals were,
without proper authorization, used for sales-display purposes in advertising certain products. Their names were used for similar purposes,
and their private lives through the channels of journalistic media were
unduly publicized to the discomfort of the individuals concerned.
Warren and Brandeis 2 comprehended the sudden vulnerability of
what Judge Cooley called the right "to be let alone" 3 -"right under
certain circumstances to protect one's name and physiognomy from becoming public property." 4 They wrote, "Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closed shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.' "5 They clearly saw that an exigency had arisen
and that there was an urgent need for the creation of a new legal right.
Existing remedies were inadequate; there could be no recovery when a
non-defamatory statement concerning an individual was true though
its publication caused the individual undue mental suffering, nor could
there be recovery for a published falsehood concerning an individual
when that statement was neither libel per se nor the cause of a pecuniary loss to the individual concerned. Surely these were wrongful acts
and the injured parties were entitled to redress in the courts based upon
a new set of legal principles.
Warren and Brandeis had given the right to privacy an identity, and
an individuality, a definition, but in substance the right had been recognized in the tribunals of ancient Greece and Rome, and in English decisions as an inherent part of such kindred rights as freedom from libel
and slander. The ancient common law doctrines protected man against
physical invasions of life and property interests, but the trend has been
toward a fuller recognition of "man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
intellect." 6 This increased liberalism of the courts was destined to play
an important role in giving additional recourse to man and render his
private life less vulnerable to the public eye and avail him of the right
to enjoy life as well as live it. Thus, redress was provided for unwarranted invasions of intangible interests as well as those of a tangible
nature. By the middle of the fourteenth century courts had rendered
2

3
4
5
6

Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193.
Cooley on Torts, 2nd ed., p. 29.
39 Michigan L. Rev. 526.
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 195.
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193.
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their first judgments for civil assault, and slander. This "new liberalism" was carried into the field of nuisances where recourse was provided
for the abatement of odors, noise, smoke, and dust that were discomforting to individuals. Similarly, the courts broadened their concept of
"property rights" and gave protection to exclusive ownership of literary
and artistic creations as well as goodwill, trademarks, and trade secrets.
The gap in the law was now in reduced proportions-it was but a short
leap from the recognition of intangible property rights to the recognition
of intangible spiritual rights.
But the courts were reluctant to recognize the right of privacy. A
few words of Johnathann Swift clearly express their problem:
"A strong dilemma in a desperate casel
To act with infamy, or quit the place."
When faced with the issue, the courts had to make a decision upon
two opposing interests. Should truth, which has through its free dissemination enabled man to continually progress and has protected him
from oppression, be suppressed so that the individual should not be
distressed by undue publicity of his person? It was a question of giving
to the individual as such a portion of those rights which he possessed in
a collective sense. Too much sovereignty given to either interest would
render an undesirable result. In the world today, there are societies
where the individual as such is completely subordinate to the state.
There also exist completely dis-united societies where the individual is
supreme. The whole fundamental philosophy underlying our American
"collectivistic" society imports a fair compromise between such opposing views.
Our courts have found it difficult to make such a compromise, and
have attempted to evade the question whenever possible. As has been
alluded to, the need for the recognition of the right of privacy was not
urgent in an extreme sense, 7 and many courts therefore refused to
grant recovery because there was no precedent upon which to predicate
a decision. In justifying such a view, the courts say in essence that
"Invasion of privacy and unwarranted notoriety are beyond the domain
of positive law, and a person is protected against such wrongs only by
a voluntary observance by others of the code of common decency." 8
7 Recovery in many instances can be based on the grounds of ibel and slander
even for the following situations as cited by Warren and Brandeis: "The press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a trade
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste,
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
newspapers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle." 4 Harvard L.
Rev. 196.
8 Anno: 138 A. L. R. 35.
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One of the first American decisions 9 (1890) to bear at least a semblance to the privacy doctrine was reported in an early issue of the
New York Times. LO The New York Supreme Court had granted a
temporary injunction restraining the defendant from photographing the
plaintiff (without the latter's consent) while she appeared scantily
dressed in a Broadway show. At the trial, the plaintiff failed to present herself and the court in accordance-found no necessity to issue
an opinion. Other decisions bearing a tendency towards a recognition
of the right to privacy were quick to follow. Just a year later, another
New York court showed evidence of a more liberal view towards the
privacy dogma. 1" In 1893, we find an opinion holding that "Private
Rights must be respected as well as the wishes and sensibilities of people." 12 And in the following year, a federal district court held that
the plaintiff had waived his right of privacy by becoming a public character. 13 Then in 1895 in Schuyler v Curtis, 14 the court recognized
that the individual is possessed of some right to protect his privacy from
the innumerable pages of public print. Finally, in Atkinson v Doherty
we see the first American decision directly concerned with the so-called
right to privacy. A cigar manufacturer used the name and likeness of
a deceased person as a label for a brand of cigars. In denying the
prayer for an injunction, the court of equity in effect repudiated the
privacy doctrine. The court said - probably in reliance upon a current English decision 15 - that it could restrain such use of one's name
and likeness only upon the grounds of libel.
In 1902 a four-to-three decision, 16 intending to repel any further
consideration of this legal "foundling" and declare such right void for
practical purposes, acted as a boomerang. The court refused to enjoin
the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's likeness in connection with the
advertising of flour although the plaintiff (female) was caused thereby
much distress and humiliation. The court reasoned: such right was
not recognized by any of the great common law writers (Blackstone,
Kent, etc.) nor sustained by precedent, and that the recognition of such
right would lead to an overwhelming amount of litigation. Justice Gray
9 Manola v Stevens, unreported case.
10 Issues of June 15, 18, 21 in the year 1890.
11 Mackenzie v Soden, Mineral Springs Co., 18 N. Y. S. 240.
12 Marks v Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N. Y. S. 908.
13 Corliss v Walker, 64 F. 280.
14

42 N. E. 22.

Dockrell v Dougall, 78 L. T. Rep. 840 Queens Bench Division. The defendant, in advertising his product, a medicine called Sallyco, used the name of
the plaintiff, a physician, as follows: "Dr. Morgan Dockrell, a physician to St.
John's Hospital, London, is prescribing Sallyco as an habitual drink. Dr. Dockrell
says nothing has done his gout so much good." The court held there was no
injury to the plaintiff's property or reputation and plaintiff could recover on no
other grounds.
16 Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co. 171 N. Y. 538 (1902).
15
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rendered a strong dissenting -opinion and cited the arguments advanced
by Warren and Brandeis. There could be only one answer to meet the
exigency caused by new social and commercial conditions, said the justice, and that is the recognition of the right of privacy based upon the
extension of the legal principles that protect one's person from attack.
The majority opinion though was the law in New York and its reception was exceptionally unpopular.
The press raised a storm of disapproval and created agitation for a
remedial statute to rectify a very undesirable situation. A much distraught justice was greatly affected by a critical editorial appearing in
the New York Times 17 and broke court precedent by writing an article
defending the decision. But public dissent was so overwhelming that
at its very next session the New York legislature enacted a statute
(Laws 1903, chap. 132) establishing a right of action for those persons
whose name or likeness was used for advertising purposes without their
written consent. This statute is as follows:
"A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the written consent of such person,
or, if a minor, of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor." (N. Y. Civil Rights Law, Sec. 50) "Any person whose
name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained
as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait or picture, to prevent *and restrain the use thereof; and
may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason
of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such a manner as is forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion,
may award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in this act shall
be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation, practicing
the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its
establishment specimens of the work of such establishment unless the
same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written
notice objecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed." Id.
Sec. 51.
The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Rhodes v Sperry
& Co. 18 (1908) and this decision was finally affirmed, after two other
affirmations in lower appellate courts, by the United States Supreme
Court. 19
18

Issue, August 23, 1902.
193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1907.

19

220 U. S. 502.

17
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Then in 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia rendered the initial
decision 20 recognizing the independent existence of the right of privacy
and accorded it proper legal protection. This court held that an invasion of one's private rights was actionable, regardless of special damages
to person, property, or character. And probably in reliance upon the
opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in the Roberson case, 21 the court stated:
"So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognized within proper
limits as a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the publication ot
one's picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for
the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser,
is an invasion of this right, that we venture to predict that the day will
come when The American Bar will marvel that a contrary view was
ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability . ..."

This optimism has been partially justified in view of the courts that
have given recognition to the existence of the right of privacy as a
common law doctrine. New Jersey, 22 Kansas, 23 Kentucky, 24 California, 25 North Carolina, 26 Missouri, 27 District of Columbia, 28
Ohio, 29 Oregon, 30 and Pennsylvania, 31 have all since taken judicial
cognizance of the right as an independent right with a definite character. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, by dicta, has approved of the
doctrine. 32 And the legislatures of Utah 33and Virginia, 34 in addition
to New York, have lent their approval in the nature of statutory enactment providing legal protection to the right of privacy.
There has by no means been universal acceptance of the right of
privacy. Some courts did advert to the right, but without committing
themselves as to their views, and then base their decisions on other
grounds. The court in Miller v Gillespie 35 inferred that it would grant
equitable relief, under proper circumstances, for an invasion of the
right of privacy. And in Hillman v Star Publishing Co. 86 the court
stated: "We find that plaintiff's case does not fall within any of the
20

Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).

21

171 N. Y. 538 (1902).

22

Edison v Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136 (1907).
Kunz v Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
Foster-Milburn Co. v Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909).
Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
Flake v Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
Munder v Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).

23
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Peed v Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927).
Friedman v Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Bd., 20 Ohio Ops. 473 (1941).
Hinish v Meier & Frank Co., 113 Pac. 438 (1941).
31 Clayman v Bernstein, 38 Pac. D&C 543 (1940).
32 Mabry v Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 17 S. W. 746 (1909).
33 The Utah Statute is similar in most respects to the New York Privacy Act.
54 Va. Code Anno. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) Sec. 5782.
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rules so far recognized by the courts permitting a recovery for an invasion of the so-called right of privacy." In neither case did the court
define or explain their respective positions concerning those circumstances and rules that were applicable to the privacy doctrine. Rhode
Island,3 7 in following the holding of the Roberson case 38 expressly
denied the existence of the right to privacy. And in a majority of the
states, the existence of the right of privacy is an undetermined question. 39 Those states that have taken a stand on the privacy question
have, by an overwhelming majority, adopted the view that there is a
legally enforceable right of privacy. Most of these cases arose over
the issue involving the publication of pictures for commercial purposes
without the consent of the owner. 40 However, there were other situations in which the right of privacy has been accorded legal protection.
The unauthorized use of the name of an author has been held to violate
the New York Statute. 41 In Mau v Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 42 a radio
broadcasting company and the commercial sponsor of a program were
assessed damages for invading the plaintiff's right to privacy through
the medium of the air waves. Motion pictures - especially news-reels
- have been guilty of violating the right. Public humiliation of a
debtor has been actionable 43 as has been the shadowing, of a person
by private detectives in such a manner as to attract public attention. 44
The unwarranted placing of one's picture in the rogue's gallery has accorded damages to the injured party. 45 Relief has been granted against
eavesdropping (the usual case is the abatement of wiretapping), 46 and
for wrongful disclosures of telegrams, private papers, and records. 47
All of these cases and the many others concerning the right to privacy
have given the right a definite legal character. Each additional case
tended to add new legal principles to the privacy doctrine - principles
37 Henry v Cherry and Webb, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Ati. 97 (1909).
38 171 N. Y. 538 (1902).
89 138 A. L. R. 33.
40 Senler v Uten Publications, 170 Misc. 551, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 319 (1938);
Miller v Madison Square Garden Co., 176 Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S. 811 (1941);
Lahiri v Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. S. 382 (1937). Most of the
cases concerning this matter involved an infringement of the New York Statute.
41 Eliot v Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. S. 989, Affirmed; 140 App. Div. 911,
125 N. Y. S. 1119 (1910).
42 28 Fed. Supp. 845 (1939).
43 Brents v Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927). A note in 55 A.L.R.
in connection with this case states: "It has been quite generally held, however,
that a method used in attempting to obtain payment of a debt, which tends to
impute dishonesty to the debtor, to throw him into disgrace and ridicule, or to
invade his right of privacy, gives a right of action for damages."
44
45
46
47

Epstein v Epstein (1906) T. H. 87.
Itzkovitch v Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 30 So. 499 (1905).
Rhodes v Graham, 238 Ky. 225 37 S. W. 46 (1931).
Anno: 138 A. L. R. 97.
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that were to act as limitations to its future application. Generally, the
right was limited to the living, and surviving relatives were denied recovery on account of publicity concerning deceased persons. The courts
had construed the privacy right to be personal, and were inclined to
follow the common law rule that "property" rights survive, but "personal" rights die with the person. This was unfortunate as most legal
scholars hold this common law doctrine to be unsound in principle. The
ancient distinction between personal and property rights is fallacious
because all rights are essentially personal. The entire concept of property deals with the rights of persons towards that property and any distinction could only be unreal. Courts realize now the error of reason
made by their predecessors and can see no beneficial reason why such
a cause of action should not survive. This change of attitude has been
reflected in some recent decisions, the most common are those in which
damages have been awarded to relatives for some unwarranted publicity
to their deceased kin. 48 Another limitation upon the privacy doctrine
holds that there is no violation of the right where the plaintiff has published the matter complained of or has consented to its publication.
Such consent, either express or implied, amounts to a waiver or a relinquishment of the right. Garden v Parfumerie4 9 is the only case that
has considered the question of revoking consent in such instances. The
court there held that consent to use of a name or photograph of a person was a mere license and could be revoked at any time. This holding
seems to be unjustifiable in that it penalizes persons who have acted
in good faith. The only logical presumption is that the courts will
discard such a notion and adopt the more conscionable view that in
the absence of any provision such consent could not be revoked at will.
A violation of the right of privacy does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events, nor in the discussion of events of the
life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, nor where
information would be a public benefit, as in the case of a candidate
for public office. The right can only be violated by paintings, writings,
pictures, or other permanent publications or reproductions, and not by
mere word of mouth. The right is denied to corporations and institutions since it was primarily designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of human beings rather than safeguard property and business
interests. 50 A further limitation upon the right restricts recovery to
conduct that is offensive only to persons of ordinary sensibilities 51 as
the court in Schuyler v Curtiss 52 stated: "...
there must be some
reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress
48
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and injury (caused by the unauthorized publication of one's likeness in
public print). It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure
fancy, nor the result of a super-sensitive and morbid mental organization." 53 The privacy doctrine is also limited in its relation with public
personages - persons who by their prominence have dedicated their
lives to the public, and have thereby waived any claim to the right of
privacy. 54 All of these limiting principles have tended to give form
and body to what was originally a vague legal concept. They crystalized
and made into a body of law a group of thoughts and ideas concerning
the right to privacy.
Almost a half-century has passed since the birth of the right of
privacy as a legal doctrine. 55 It grew in response to a "need" brought
about by modern life. It was the answer of justice to a mode of carefree conduct exhibited by those in control of such American institutions
as the daily newspaper, the movies, the radio, the telephone, and the
telegraph. Historically, the privacy doctrine presented a constant
struggle between two opposing interests; the interest of the individual
per se and the interest of society. True, this struggle had its effect
upon the courts and they had been reluctant to commit themselves.
But, today the courts fully recognize the right of privacy. They now
for the first time feel no obligation to indulge in lengthy statements of
apology. They issue their decisions firmly, simply, and straight to the
point. This is the final stage in the acceptance of any new legal doctrine. The fear of the New York court, in the Roberson case, that a
recognition of the right to privacy would lead to a deluge of litigation
now seems to have been unfounded. There have been comparatively
few cases involving the right of privacy, and in these cases the courts
generally administered good judgment in their application of the doctrine. And today, as the doctrine of the right to privacy advances into
maturity, the words of Justice Gray " ". . . . that the day will come
when the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability.... ," attain an added
significance.
Jerome Gold.
53 The court further went on to say, "Such a class of mind might regard
the right as interfered with and violated by the least reference even of a complimentary nature to some illustrious ancestor without first seeking for and obtaining
the consent of descendants. Feelings that are thus easily and unnaturally injured
and distressed under such circumstances are too sensitive to be recognized by any
purely earthly tribunal."
54 Martin v F. I. Y. Theatre Co., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 67.
Corliss v Walker, 64 Fed. 280, 31 L. R. A. 283.
55 Pavesich v New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
5 Per dissenting opinion in the Roberson case.

